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Abstract

ters. Botnets are particularly insidious because they can accomplish whatever code their malicious master is capable
and imaginative enough to deliver to them. It is clear that
bonets have become the most serious security threat on the
Internet[7].
However, traditional packet analysis intrusion detection
is stymied by the encrypted P2P botnet command and control network traffic. Our model assists in overcoming this
barrier by using Internet traffic recorded in firewall log entries to indirectly indicate locally infected computers. We
have successfully used this model to locate previously unknown infected computers.
The P2P botnet model and the general version of the
model are explained in Section 2. Then in Section 3 we
relate the methodology on how the model worked to advantage. Section 4 provides references for related work, and
Section 5 is the conclusion.

We propose a model for using firewall log entries of denied inbound Internet traffic for indirect discovery of local
IP addresses that have security problems. This method is
used successfully to discover two computers on the network
of Southern Illinois University which were infected with malicious feral software, as well as two more IP addresses on
the university network with other security problems.

1

Introduction

Malicious software began to become dangerous to computing environments soon after the first computer virus was
created on November 3, 1983[2]. Intrusion detection and
prevention became paramount after the Internet (Morris)
Worm of 1988 disrupted computer operations on a wide
scale. However, efforts at information security have not
been able to completely prevent malicious Internet activity.
Other notable infections include Code Red in 2001, and the
SQL Slammer in 2003. In 2005, a sniffer on the TJ Maxx
network was used to steal over 45 million credit card numbers costing that corporation over $100 million in settlement
claims.
In 2007, an army of infected computers was used in coordinated Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in cyber warfare
to disable the network of Estonia, a small country[3, 8].
These armies are called botnets with each infected computer called a bot (short for robot.) Bots take their orders
from bot masters via command and control centers (C&C)
using various protocols, such as HTML, Internet Relay Chat
(IRC), and Peer-to-Peer (P2P). Estimates of the numbers
and sizes of botnets vary, but one study, for example[10],
discovered 3,290 unique IRC botnets with 700,700 distinct
IP addresses. P2P botnets are more problematic because
they encrypt their traffic, and their distributed system makes
it difficult to trace and find the command and control cen-
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2

Model

We developed the model while studying P2P bots and
then we generalized the model. In this section, first the
model specific to P2P bots is described. Then, we describe
the general version of the model using Fig. 2.

2.1

P2P Botnet Model

When a computer gets newly infected with a P2P bot,
it attempts to notify the bot master’s C&C of its infection
so that the C&C knows that the newly infected computer is
ready for further instructions. This scenario describes the
specific P2P botnet model as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Step 1 in Fig. 1.a illustrates the initial contact, which can
be accomplished in a virtually unlimited manner of mundane ways imitating normal Internet traffic to one or more
IP addresses and/or domain names encoded in the malicious
software which infected the computer.
Since a border firewall is typically configured to allow
outgoing traffic to the Internet which was initiated by a
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Figure 1. This figure illustrates the P2P Botnet Model. See the text for a detailed description.
computer on the internal network, this initial contact from
the infected computer, which appears to be normal network
traffic, goes out unchallenged and likely unlogged. If any
logs of this traffic do go to a log server, these logs are indistinguishable from normal network traffic in the model.
The inititial contact goes to one or more computers in
or associated with the P2P botnet. Step 2 in Fig. 1.a symbolizes how the contact from the newly infected computer
transmits via this P2P network through the Internet cloud
obscuring its route to the C&C of the bot master, making it
very difficult to locate and identify the bot master.
Step 3 in Fig. 1.a symbolizes that the C&C has one or
more contacts with the bot master, who may not even get
a notice of each newly infected computer, but who at least
gets periodic summary information of the extent of his or
her botnet.
Step 4 represents a transition from Fig. 1.a to Fig. 1.b. At
some point in time, which could be days later, the process
begins for the bot master to send commands to his or her
bots.
We do not actually see what happens when the actions
in Fig. 1.a occur in the model. The newly infected computer in the model is not a honeypot; it is a computer being
used by someone who responds to spam e-mail, clicks on
a malicious website, or takes other action which gets the

computer infected. (While we can monitor known e-mail
spam and known malicious web sites, we cannot know in
every case when a user takes an action to infect his or her
computer, at the time the infection occurs.)
The bot master initiates action with one or more of his
or her C&C servers as illustrated in Step 5 of Fig. 1.b. Step
6 illustrates that the action is propogated through the Internet via the P2P botnet, which hides the route back to the
bot master. We have seen the logs from apparently over
40,000 unique IP addresses in a P2P botnet attempting to
make contact back to an infected computer.
In the model, the incoming botnet traffic is blocked by
the firewall because these botnet sessions were initiated outside of the network, which is consistent with a properly configured default deny firewall. Step 7 in Fig. 1.b illustrates
this network traffic being blocked. Step 8 symbolizes logs
of this blocked network traffic being sent to the log server
for analysis. The IP addresses being blocked by the firewall
in Step 7 do not have to include the same IP addresses the
newly infected computer contacted in Step 1 of Fig. 1.a,
even though they look similar. Also, in Step 1, only one
contact has to get out, whereas in Step 7, many thousands
of attempted contacts come back.
The model was used to practical advantage when the firewall logs from Step 8 were analyzed to discover two previ-
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test data, the bulk of which were logs of incoming traffic
which was denied by the border firewall.
We parsed the log entries and loaded the data into a
MySQL database which summarized the data, creating an
eight-dimensional vector for each IP address of the following elements: tot cnt (total count) is the total number of
log entries; src cnt (source count) is the number of unique
IP addresses from the outside; port cnt (port count) is the
number of unique destination ports; lo port (low port) is
the lowest destination port; hi port (high port) is the highest
destination port; and, icmp cnt (ICMP count), tcp cnt (TCP
count), and udp cnt (UDP count) are the counts of each of
those protocols.
As an example, the vector for the local Bot1 IP address approximated these values: 400,000; 40,000; 80; 80;
60,000; 0; 100; 400,000—meaning that there were (approximately) 400,000 firewall log entries from 40,000 outside
IP addresses attempting connections on 80 destination ports
from Port 80 to Port 60,000, with no ICMP entries, 100
TCP entries, and 400,000 UDP entries. (The same traffic
on another network would likely have different values because these values depend on the specific firewall settings
that produce the log entries.) Approximately 60,000 of the
IP addresses had entries, giving an input matrix size of 8 by
approximately 60,000.
We used a Self-Organizing Map (SOM), a type of Artificial Neural Network (ANN), to cluster the vectors in the
matrix. See [6] for more information about SOM, a technical description of which is beyond the scope of this paper.
We clustered the data using 1,000 nodes, with each node
representing a cluster, providing an average of 60 local IP
addresses per cluster. Node 996 was the Best Matching Unit
(BMU) for both Bot1 and Bot2, and no other IP addresses
had Node 996 as the BMU, meaning that SOM successfully
isolated the bot IP addresses from the other IP addresses.
We then also used SOM for classification of new firewall
log data to look for additional bots on the network. We processed new feral firewall log entries on a daily basis looking
for local IP addresses which had Node 996 as the BMU. The
distributed nature of the university prevents general access
to suspect computers, but we have, nonetheless, been able
to confirm some results. The SOM produced less than one
Node 996 match per day on the average. We labeled the
matches starting with Suspect01, and the confirmed results
are as follows.
The SOM discovered Suspect01 on March 29, 2008, and
again on April 1, 2008. Another appliance later detected
Suspect01 making probes of IP addresses in a manner indicating an infection. Suspect01 was found to have both
P2P software and multiple infections, some dating back to
the SOM discovery. However, the exact P2P software and
infections were not made available to us.
The SOM discovered both Suspect02 and Suspect03 on
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Figure 2. This figure illustrates a generic form
of the P2P Botnet Model. See the text for
more detailed information.

ously unknown feral bots on the network.

2.2

General Model

The P2P Botnet Model can be generalized for other types
of malignant network behavior as illustrated in Fig. 2. In
Fig. 2.a, a malignant IP address produces a putrid network
scent which is picked up by other computers on the Internet.
We cannot distiguishable this scent from normal network
traffic in the model. The putrid network scent is spread via
P2P or other means on the Internet. In Fig. 2.b, attempted
responding contacts are made to the malignant IP address,
where they are denied by the firewall and logged.

3

Methodology

We tested the P2P botnet model on border firewall log
entries for the university’s Class B network. We had become
aware of two P2P bots on the network which we labeled
Bot1 and Bot2.
We analyzed log entries for 24-hour periods which included inbound traffic for Bot1 on February 6, 2008, and
for Bot2 on February 12, 2008. These logs also contained
data for potentially all of the other IP addresses on the network. We had over 20 million border firewall entries in the
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April 1, 2008, and the users stated that they were using nonmalicious P2P software.
Suspect04 was discovered on April 4, 2008. We could
not find any evidence that this IP address was assigned or
active on the network. One possible explanation of this
could be that the traffic was backlash from a spoofed IP
address.
Suspect10 was discovered on July 24, 2008, and was an
appliance which was using outdated firmware and which
had a web interface which was vulnerable to a cross-site
scripting attack.
The SOM discovered Suspect13 on August 12, 2008.
A couple of hours later, an alert from another detection
method indicated that Suspect13 was infected with a P2P
bot. Suspect13 was disabled from network traffic. However,
Suspect13 was discovered again by the SOM on August 13,
2008, for the network traffic on the previous day before it
was disabled. A couple of hours later, again, the other detection method provided an alert stating that Suspect13 was
positive for a P2P bot.
Suspect17 was a DHCP IP address used at a station to
assist incoming students in finding and cleaning malware
off of their computers and in setting up Windows firewalls,
automated patching, and anti-virus software. No computer
was logged in as using this IP address when the pertinent
log entries were recorded by the firewall. We believe a putrid network scent on this IP address was caused by one or
more of several possible problems with student computers,
including vulnerabilities, and possible malware.
No other P2P bots of the same type were detected on
the network by other means on days in which we ran SOM
analyses. Some of the above suspects do not fall clearly into
true positive and false positive catagories, but it is apparent
by observation that both the P2P bot model and the general
version of the model have validity.

4

fic, and the incoming traffic from the botnet never reaches
the local network through a properly configured firewall.
Many papers have been written on rule-based and
anomaly intrusion detection, but only a few have been written on intrusion detection models.
Kemmerer [5] proposed a network intrusion detection
model in 1997 which he called Network State Transition
Analysis Tool (NSTAT) and which was based on earlier
host-based models. He noted that IDS did not take into consideration two or more users working together to execute a
penetration!
Cho [1] proposed a Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
model in 2003 to improve intrusion detection performance
by only considering the privilege transition flows based on
the domain knowledge of attacks.
More recently, in 2007, Zhou [9] noted the massive number of simple alerts of low-level security-related events for
signature-based (rule-based) IDS, and proposed a formal
model utilizing the concept of capability to implement an
alert correlator for complex multistage intrusions, expanding an earlier requires/provides model.
None of these previously published network models are
appropriate for P2P botnets because there are no observable
state transitions, privilege transitions, or alert correlations
to consider.

5

Conclusion

We proposed a P2P botnet model and a general version
of the model to describe Internet responses to bot infected
computers and malignant IP addresses on the university network. We showed how this model can be used to indirectly discover infected computers and other network security problems on the network by analyzing firewall log
entries of denied Internet traffic.
Advantages of the model are that it suggests techniques
in addition to rule-based intrusion detection, malware detection, and intrusion prevention in the effort to eradicate
malicious software and other security problems. A disadvantage of the model is that the specific techniques for utilizing it will vary for different locations because of different network environments and different firewall configurations. Even so, we found some security issues faster using
the model than we did by using other methods. We also
found a security issue involving an appliance which likely
would never have been discovered by other means.

Related Work

Ilgun[4] categorizes three types of intrusion detection:
rule-based penetration identification, anomaly detection,
and model-based intrusion detection.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) appliances are primarily rule-based: They look for strings, flags, ports, and other
information in packets and traffic flow data that indicate
known intrusion patterns. Two disadavantages for rulebased systems in looking for P2P bots are that 1) you have to
know in advance what you are looking for, and 2) encrypted
packets obfuscate needed information for rule-matching.
Anomaly detection uses statistical or other methods to
determine normal network traffic, and then reports what is
not normal. Disadvantages of anomaly detection of P2P
botnets are that the initial outgoing contacts of the newly
infected computers are indistinguishable from normal traf-
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